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Flexibility, Argumentation and Confrontation. How Deliberative
Minipublics Can Affect Policies on Controversial Issues
Abstract
Over the last few decades, deliberative minipublics have been used as inclusive and innovative practices to
integrate traditional policy-making. Because of their policy-oriented aim, but also owing to the usually not
legally-binding nature, some scholars have recently pointed out the importance of understanding how and to
what extent they actually manage to influence the decisions of public authorities, especially when they deal
with highly controversial issues, such as locally unwanted land use or ethic matters.
This article has the aim of offering a contribution in this direction, by presenting the findings of a comparative
analysis of two deliberative processes promoted by public authorities to integrate decision-making in order to
deal with highly controversial issues. The two processes had significantly different impacts on the final policies.
The analysis, conducted by means of ethnographic and qualitative methods, has shown that how the
minipublics were designed and how deliberation was put in practice were crucial aspects in determining the
effective influence of the minipublics on policy decisions. In particular, the use of a strictly deliberative design
on such contentious issues has proved to be counterproductive, because it has generated distortions and
produced institutional conflicts, while the use of a hybrid path, although not free from problems, has proved
to be a more effective solution.
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Introduction 
 
The literature on deliberation already counts more than twenty years of 
contributions and reflections, ranging from theoretical issues to empirical 
inquiries and normative propositions. 
 
Although partially different theoretical conceptions have been identified1, the 
different nuances still point out a shared view on the conditions necessary for 
a fair democracy: dialogue as the essential foundation of any democratic 
process, shared knowledge that integrates diverse viewpoints as the necessary 
precondition for discussion, and mutual justification as the main rule for a 
constructive outcome of the dialogue (Mansbridge, et al. 2010; Cuppen, 2012; 
Steiner, 2012). 
 
Two main research approaches have become consolidated on the basis of this 
common perspective. The first considers deliberation as a particular mode of 
communication. From this perspective, the main aim is to investigate to what 
extent and what kind of deliberation may be found in various contexts: 
institutional arenas (Bessette, 1994; Elster, 1994; Pollack, 2003; Steiner, et al. 
2004; Naurin, 2007, 2009; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010; Lundin & Öberg, 
2014); civil society discursive venues such as media, groups and movements 
(Mathews, 1996; Heikkilä & Kunelius, 1998; Dzur, 2002; Della Porta, 2005, 
2013; Ettema, 2007; Mansbridge, et al. 2010; Maia 2012); communities such 
as families and groups of friends (Johnston Conover, et al. 2002; Jacobs, et al. 
2009; Maia 2012); and individuals (Goodin, 2003). 
 
The second approach looks at deliberation as a particular “democratic 
innovation” (Smith, 2009), to integrate traditional decision-making through 
advanced forms of citizen involvement in dialogical processes, based on the 
previously mentioned principles of shared knowledge, dialogue and diversity 
of viewpoints and arguments. This perspective focuses on what is called 
structured deliberation (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006), which takes place in ad hoc 
mini-publics (Fung, 2003; Dryzek, 2010; Moore, 2012) involving lay citizens 
in structured discussions on a particular public decision,2 with the support of 
professional facilitators who design the processes and lead the discussions 
(Moore, 2012; Steiner, 2012).  
 
                                                     
1 Hendriks (2006) distinguishes between “micro” deliberation, where actors tend to use 
primarily well argued statements, and “macro” deliberation, where discourses are articulated 
through several forms of communicative action. From a partially different point of view, 
Baechtiger, et al. (2010) refer to “type I deliberation” as an ideal process wherein actors of 
equal status and resources discuss rationally, sincerely justify their opinions using mutually 
acceptable arguments, and are willing to reach a common understanding and to be persuaded 
by the best arguments, while “type II deliberation” would be a more pragmatic conception that 
includes several forms of discussion characterized by dialectics among discourses. In this 
perspective, for example, not only sincere argumentations, but also some kinds of strategic 
uses of arguments are allowed (Mansbridge, et al. 2010), and arguments are not only the 
complex ones defined by Habermas (1981), but also motivations expressed through 
storytelling or metaphors (Mansbridge, et al. 2010; Nanz, 2010; Steiner, 2012).  
2
 Partially recalling Dahl’s definition, Fung (2003) defines mini-publics as highly artifactual 
efforts to involve citizens in the public sphere through the inclusion of different voices, the 
provision of information material and the facilitation of structured dialogues. 
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The article falls into this second strand, and it has the goal of addressing the 
issue of the influence of structured deliberation on highly controversial policy 
decisions that directly affect citizens and tend to trigger social conflicts. The 
matter is relevant in a two-fold sense. First, since deliberative processes are 
currently not legally-binding for representative policy-makers, the matter of 
their real impact on policy decisions is fundamental, if these processes “are to 
be considered something more than just a human laboratory” (Font and 
Blanco, 2007, 580). Second, controversial policies represent one of the most 
interesting and at the same time challenging fields of practice for deliberative 
democracy. If one of the main questions concerning deliberative mini-publics 
is “in what kinds of policy domains are such activities appropriate” (Fischer, 
2013, 104), according to Gutmann (1996, 344) “decision-making by 
deliberation among free and equal citizens is the most defensible justification 
anyone has to offer for provisionally settling controversial issues.” But 
controversial issues seem to pertain to a policy domain that is particularly 
unfavorable for the application of the deliberative ideal: such issues usually 
raise strong social protests, the positions of the actors often seem inconcilable 
and the decisional processes may result in a state of stalemate or in 
authoritarian impositions by the political institutions. The few participatory 
processes in this field have mostly been designed using consensus building 
techniques (Susskind, et al. 1999) or referenda (Bherer & Breux, 2012).  
 
The article addresses the following question: when a deliberative mini-public 
is adopted by an institutional authority to contribute to a highly controversial 
policy decision, what makes the mini-public effective? In order to deal with 
the question, a comparative analysis has been conducted concerning two 
deliberative processes on land use in which high concentrated costs for the 
residents and dispersed benefits are involved.3 The processes took place in 
Italy between 2009 and 2011. These cases had a very different impact on the 
final decisions, one being quite problematic and the other somewhat 
successful. The analysis has shown that their diverse performances stemmed 
in particular from their different designs: the strictly deliberative process has 
proved to be counterproductive, producing an uncertain efficacy and 
generating controversies among institutions; the hybrid format, although not 
free of problems, has been more effective and has not generated controversies 
among the institutions. Ethnographic and qualitative methods have been 
adopted, through in-depth participatory observation of the processes, 
interviews with the protagonists and actors with a privileged view on the 
decisional processes, and content analysis on the speech acts of the dialogic 
sessions.4  
                                                     
3
 Examples of this kind of policy are the construction of large transport infrastructures or the 
localization of potentially dangerous plants, such as incinerators or waste landfills. 
4
 We are grateful to the organizers and the promoting institutions for having allowed us to 
follow and report the whole processes, including a codification of the speech acts of the 
participants in the main dialogic sessions (a total of 590 speech acts). The speech act analysis 
(Steiner, et al. 2004; Stromer-Galley, 2007; Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger, 2009) has been 
conducted to outline the flow of the general discourse (arguments, elements of agreement and 
disagreement) and to identify explicit references to prejudices. We would also like to thank 
the members of the citizen committees and environmental associations, the local authorities, 
public servants, participants and experts who agreed to be interviewed between 2009 and 2012 
(a total of 50 interviews). 
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 The article is organized as follows. The literature on structured deliberation in 
policy-making is built on in the next section, in order to develop the analytical 
framework. Section two offers a synthetic description of the two cases. The 
findings of our research are explained in the third section. The main arguments 
in support of the analytic explanation are summarized in the conclusions. 
 
 
Structured Deliberation in Policy Making 
 
Structured deliberation in policy-making takes place through “highly 
artificial” processes (Fung, 2003, 338) designed and managed by skilled 
facilitators to create arenas in which lay citizens contribute to a public decision 
through informed and argument-based dialogues. The public authorities that 
are responsible for a decision usually make an informal promise to take into 
serious consideration the policy proposals provided by the participants. From a 
not too ambitious perspective, it can be stated that a deliberative process 
affects policy decisions when public authorities implement the proposals of 
the mini-public or when, although not actually implementing them, public 
authorities justify their refusal and also show they explicitly recognize the 
validity of some of the arguments proposed by the deliberants.  
 
The variables that affect the efficacy of deliberative as well as participatory 
processes are probably numerous (Font & Smith, 2014). So far, empirical 
studies have suggested that at least three factors could favor the efficacy of 
these processes on (more or less controversial) policy decisions: a serious 
commitment of the political authority, the timing of the process and the active 
interest of civil society in the issue at stake.  
 
In their study on 54 participatory processes on environmental issues in the 
Great Lakes region (Canada), Beierle and Konisky (2000) pointed out that the 
capacity to influence policy decisions mainly depended on the strong 
commitment of the institutional authorities who were responsible for the final 
decisions. Political commitment was also an important precondition in the 
case of the deliberative process on the new Charter for the city of Chelsea, in 
Massachusetts (Podziba, 2006), in some Spanish citizen juries (Font & 
Blanco, 2007) and in some participatory budgeting in Brazil (Abers, 2000; 
Baiocchi, 2003). This commitment may be publicly unexpressed, although in 
some cases public authorities make explicit promises and provide a clear and 
quantifiable amount of financial resources devoted to the process (Baiocchi, 
2005; Nylen, 2003).  
 
The timing of the process, that is, its start at an early policy stage in which 
alternative options are still available, would probably have increased the 
almost null efficacy of some processes. In the case of a public works decision 
in Oxford (UK), the participatory process did not affect the final decision of 
the City Council, because the institutional authority consulted citizens when 
the project had already been defined and significant alternatives were not 
really possible, making the stakes de facto non-existent (Brownill, 2009). 
Holzinger (2000), analyzing the reasons for the inefficacy of a participatory 
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process concerning the policy of waste management in Neuss (Germany), 
stressed that the failure in part depended on the lack of a clear degree of 
freedom of the participatory process in the official policy-making cycle. 
Gauthier and Simard (2007) have emphasized this factor and highlighted that 
the major weakness of the citizens’ involvement in environmental decision-
making promoted by the Bureau d’Audiences  Publiques sur l’Environment in 
Quebec was the late timing of the processes, which severely limited their 
possibility of changing the projects under discussion.  
 
Finally, some studies on participatory budgeting have shown that the presence 
of a local civil society that is willing to actively participate in public decisions 
favors the adoption of citizen policy proposals by public officials (Abers, 
2000; Baiocchi, 2003, 2005). The activism of groups and citizen committees 
acts as a factor of external stimulus and pressure on the commitment of the 
political authorities (Nylen, 2003).  
 
As pointed out in the aforementioned studies, the capacity of a participatory 
process to influence policy decisions is affected by contextual factors. 
However, when a process is carefully designed and facilitated, as deliberative 
processes are, how it is structured may also be relevant in terms of increasing 
or reducing its capacity to influence policy decisions (Font & Smith,  2014), 
especially when these decisions are controversial and likely to raise conflict 
and protests.  
 
The article will show that the way in which two deliberative processes were 
designed affected their capacity to influence policy decisions. It will be argued 
how this happened, by explaining the mechanisms generated by the design 
choices. 
 
The Cases 
 
The presented cases are two structured deliberation processes that were 
financed and promoted by local institutions in order to deal with locally 
unwanted land uses (LULUs).5 The former concerned a project on a new 
stretch of highway in the city of Genoa, and it took place in 2009, while the 
latter was organized almost two years later and was about a project on a new 
pyro-gasifier for industrial waste disposal in a small Tuscan town. The 
conflictual nature of these kinds of project is well known in Italy. In 2013, 
25% of 336 LULU protests concerned waste disposal plants and 10% 
concerned large transport infrastructures (NIMBY Forum 2014). In particular, 
the new stretch of highway, which could potentially produce benefits in terms 
of urban traffic decongestion, would also imply the abatement of several 
                                                     
5
 The acronym LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) is used to identify territorial conflicts 
that are raised in projects characterized by diffused benefits and concentrated costs. The 
concept is a variant of the more well-known acronym NIMBY (Not in My Backyard). While 
the term NIMBY implicitly assumes the viewpoint of the promoter of a public work or 
project, and thus attributes a negative connotation to the phenomenon, the term LULU is used 
from a neutral perspective (Popper, 1987; Dear, 1992; Rabe, 1994; Hunter and Leyden, 1995; 
Takahashi, 1998; Schively, 2007). 
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buildings and an increase in acoustic and atmospheric pollution for several 
years. The new pyro-gasifier, which was based on an innovative small-size 
technology that could lead to a more equitable and sustainable territorial 
distribution of industrial waste plants, would produce (limited) polluting 
emissions. 
 
The cases are very similar, in terms of the previously mentioned exogenous 
factors. In both cases, the institutional authorities responsible for the final 
decisions had publicly expressed serious commitment toward the output of the 
deliberative processes, and there was a concrete possibility of influencing and 
even rejecting the preliminary projects. In addition, both processes were 
introduced in contexts with an already aware and active local civil society, 
since several episodes of the mobilization of environmental groups and citizen 
committees had already taken place in the past to protest against other similar 
projects. The issues were also framed in a similar way (Barisione, 2012) with 
much of the information phase being focused on the original project rather 
than on other alternative options, from different viewpoints (engineering 
aspects, environmental impact, health impact) and confronting different 
considerations (experts, stakeholders and technicians with different opinions 
on the public work). 
 
A New Highway Stretch 
In Genoa, the construction of a new highway stretch alongside the already 
existent one, which runs through the centre of the town, is a topic that has 
been under discussion since the eighties. A first draft, dating back to 1984, 
was strongly opposed by several citizen committees, and at that time the 
decisional process ended in stalemate. A new policy window opened in 2001, 
when the public work was included in a National programme of strategic 
public works. A second project was developed between 2003 and 2005 by 
Highways for Italy (HI), the public company that is in charge of the Italian 
highway network, but its approval was again shelved after new local 
opposition. In 2006, HI drew up a third project that was approved by the 
Region, the Province and the Municipality of Genoa, the three administrative 
organizations in charge of permits for the implementation of the work. The 
project included, amongst others, the demolition and reconstruction of a 
highway bridge in a highly populated area adjacent to a large factory. Again, 
this third project raised oppositions and protests, but this time the mayor of 
Genoa decided to promote a deliberative process to discuss the HI project and 
other alternative options with the citizens.6 The process was in part designed 
according to the French model of the Debàt Public (Revel, et al. 2007). In 
November 2008, the City Council appointed an independent Commission to 
design and manage the whole process. HI soon had to draw up a dossier with 
various alternatives as a preliminary knowledge base for the participants. A 
phase of bilateral meetings between the Commission and 72 stakeholders then 
followed, with the task of mapping all the opinions and discourses about the 
topic and the various aspects that could be addressed in the public meetings. 
The direct participation of citizens started in 2009, and immediately raised the 
local mobilization of civil society leaders, associations and citizen committees. 
                                                     
6
 The process website: http://urbancenter.comune.genova.it/spip.php?rubrique7068. 
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A group of entrepreneurs started an intense communication campaign in the 
main local newspapers in order to promote the usefulness of the new highway. 
Some citizen committees instead formed a network to oppose the public work, 
and organized a protest march in which nearly three thousand people took 
part. Criticism of the Commission and the process came from both sides. 
 
Overall, the deliberative process lasted about six months and alternated 
moments of information exchange and face-to-face discussion. At the same 
time, organizations and individuals could upload documents to address 
specific issues or propose alternative projects on an online platform (the 
“Notebook of the actors”). The public meetings took place over three phases: 
six meetings were focused on the alternative options projected by HI and were 
open to all citizens; six meetings were focused on specific issues related to the 
public works and again there was no selection of participants; four planning 
workshops were designed to deal with controversial issues that had emerged in 
the previous meetings, with the aim of suggesting new solutions (table 1). 
Overall, in the first and second phase meetings, 33 technicians and experts 
were involved, and 45 Notebooks of the actors were uploaded on the website 
by organizations and ordinary citizens.  
 
The deliberative process ended with the Commission drawing up a report, in 
which the core contents of the debate were synthesized. The report stated that 
the process had produced new proposals for the highway stretch and a request 
was made to establish a local observatory composed of residents to control the 
implementation phase. A few days after the Commission presentation, HI 
presented a new project, in which one of the new options proposed by the 
participants was clearly taken into consideration. The new project resulted in 
having much less impact on the territory; in terms of the demolitions of 
buildings, the residents living between 25 and 60 meters from the highway 
decreased from 497 to 85 while the residents subjected to the demolition of 
their houses dropped from 503 to 122. In addition, other suggestions made at 
the meetings were included in the new project: the adoption of a new 
excavation technique to further reduce the risks associated with the extraction 
of asbestos rocks, the remuneration of the demolishing houses at market prices 
(above the minimum compensation required by the Law), and the institution of 
a local observatory to control the implementation phase.  
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Table 1. The Design of the Deliberative Process in Genoa 
 
Phase 
 
Meetings and topic 
 
Participants 
 
Setting 
 
I 6 meetings on the 
alternative projects 
HI project managers;  
Municipal directors; 
citizens (no selection) 
1. presentations by 
HI technicians and 
municipal directors 
2. questions from 
citizens and answers 
by proponents 
II 
Thematic meetings: 
1. reasons for the public 
work 
2. alternative stretches  
3. yard management 
4. health impacts 
5. impact on buildings 
6. environmental 
compensations 
HI technicians;  
experts with different 
viewpoints (selected by the 
Commission);  
citizens (no selection) 
1. discussion between 
technicians and 
experts 
2. questions from 
citizens and answers 
by technicians and 
experts 
Planning workshops: 
1. urban mobility 
scenarios 
2. compensations for the 
inhabitants 
members of citizen 
committees and of 
environmental associations; 
municipal technicians; 
HI project managers III 
Planning workshops: 
3. alternative options 
4. alternative options 
HI project managers; 
citizens selected through the 
outreach method 
discussion based on 
shared knowledge 
and argumentation 
 
In 2010, the Region, the Province and the Municipality of Genoa declared they 
were in favor of the new project, although several political authorities, 
including the President of the Region, did not appreciate it and preferred the 
original project. After a few months, ten residents were elected to set up the 
local control observatory. The leader of the main local committee that was 
against the highway stretch was also among the elected.  
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment was completed in June 2013. 
Currently, HI is expected to obtain a co-financing from the national 
government. 
 
A Small Pyro-Gasifier 
Castelfranco is a Tuscan town with 13,000 inhabitants and is part of a major 
industrial area that is dedicated to the treatment and processing of leather. 
 
At the beginning of 2010, one of the private waste-treatment companies in the 
area, Waste Recycling, presented a project for the construction of a small 
pyro-gassifier to dispose of industrial waste.7 It then received the preliminary 
authorizations from the Municipality, the Province of Pisa, the Region and the 
Azienda Sanitaria Locale (the local public health organization). 
 
                                                     
7
 Pyro-gasification is a technique that is based on the heating of waste in a room with limited 
oxygen, in order to produce a synthesis gas (the so called syngas), which is then subjected to 
combustion to generate energy. 
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The project raised strong opposition from two citizen committees, one of 
which had been active throughout the territory since the eighties, promoting 
campaigns and protests against waste landfills and incinerators, while the 
other had been set up more recently and was part of the Zero Waste 
international movement. Aware of the tensions generated by past 
demonstrations against other plants, the Province of Pisa, before ending the 
authorization process, suggested organizing a public discussion process with 
the local population. 
 
In July 2010, the Province and the Municipality submitted a request to the 
Tuscan Agency for Public Participation.8 The request concerned financing for 
the realization of a deliberative process to discuss the project of the pyro-
gasifier and other alternative options to dispose of the industrial waste from 
the area. The proposal was approved and funded by the Agency, and it set up 
in the classic form of a citizen jury (Crosby, 1996; Smith & Wales, 1999). A 
group of facilitators was charged with conducting the whole process. Firstly, 
they appointed a Steering committee composed of 16 local stakeholders (the 
Municipality, the Province, the Azienda Sanitaria Locale, the company, some 
factories from the area, citizen committees and environmental associations), 
with the task of overseeing the implementation of the entire process. Fifty 
jurors were then randomly selected, by a research center, from a stratified 
sample of the local population, in order to create a heterogeneous group of 
citizens, in terms of demographic variables and in terms of opinions on the 
issue. Widespread skepticism about a jury composed of randomly selected 
citizens and about a process conducted by ambiguous actors, called 
“facilitators”, soon emerged. The press and a local TV station ensured good 
media coverage, while about 10,000 copies of newsletters were distributed 
throughout the territory and in other surrounding municipalities.  
 
The jurors participated in six meetings in 2011, during which they could 
obtain information and discuss the project and the alternatives. Four thematic 
meetings were alternated with plenary sessions and small group sessions, with 
the main aim of obtaining information from experts with different viewpoints. 
The third and the sixth meetings had more constructive aims, the former being 
oriented toward defining the lines of the following meetings and the latter 
being oriented toward elaborating policy recommendations (table 2).  
 
The jury declared it was contrary to the pyro-gasifier and proposed the 
hypothesis of building another larger waste disposal plant, based on a different 
type of technology. After the publication of the jury recommendations, 
conflict arose among the public institutions, as the municipal council wanted 
to accept the jury’s recommendations, while the Region preferred to insert the 
pyro-gasifier in the regional plan of the strategic public works (Regional Law 
35/2011); Waste Recycling therefore began to construct the plant. A long legal 
dispute followed between the Municipality and the Region. The construction 
of the plant has finished, but the authorization process for its use still remains 
uncertain, in terms of timing and real feasibility. 
                                                     
8
 The Agency for Public Participation is an independent agency established by Regional Law 
69/07. Its main task is to fund and regulate participatory processes promoted by public 
institutions or the civil society.   
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 Table 2. The Design of the Tuscan Process 
 
Phase 
 
Meetings and topic 
 
Participants 
 
Setting 
 
I 
Two thematic 
meetings: 
1. waste management 
2. technical features of 
the pyro-gasifier 
50 jurors (random 
selection); 
experts with different 
viewpoints (selected 
by the Board of 
Trustees) 
1. presentations by experts 
2. formulation of questions in 
small groups 
3. discussion between experts 
and jurors based on an exchange 
of arguments 
II Intermediate decisional meeting Jurors 
discussion to direct the topics of 
the following meetings 
III 
Two meetings on the 
issues proposed by the 
jurors: 
1. environment and 
health impacts 
2. alternative options 
to the pyro-gasifier 
jurors; 
experts with different 
viewpoints 
1. presentations by experts 
2. formulation of questions in 
small groups 
3. discussion between experts 
and jurors based on an exchange 
of arguments 
IV Final decisional 
meeting Jurors 
discussion to formulate policy 
recommendations based on 
exchange of arguments 
 
 
Deliberative Design and the Impact on Policy Decisions 
 
As far as the design of deliberative mini-publics is concerned, two dimensions 
are particularly important: the way of including different views, which is 
mainly linked to the participant selection method and the way of making 
participants discuss, which is structured through facilitation methods (Carson 
& Hartz-Karp, 2005; Moore, 2012). “Pure” deliberative mini-publics (Braun 
& Schultz, 2010), such as deliberative polls and citizen juries, which were 
initially imagined by academics for research purposes (Fishkin, 1991; Crosby, 
1996) and only later applied to real policy-making, usually follow some 
procedural requirements. Participants are randomly selected from stratified 
samples, which are representative of the population in terms of some 
demographic and opinion variables (Steiner, 2012). The aim of the random 
selection is not only to reach ordinary citizens who are not used to engaging in 
political activities, but also often to create arenas of “blank slate” participants, 
with no clear interest or commitment toward the topic (Kleinman, et al. 2011, 
234). The interactions inside these mini-publics are structured and regulated 
by professional facilitators, who work to make people exchange reasonable 
and universal arguments, reflect on values and principles, and interact 
respectfully (Mansbridge, et al. 2006; Steiner, 2012). The idea behind this 
model is that it helps to produce creative solutions that will be able to persuade 
not only the people who take part in the discussions but also the wider public. 
 
Both the processes described above were designed and facilitated by 
practitioners, who clearly knew the deliberative imperatives, but designed the 
processes in different ways. The Tuscan mini-public was very similar to a pure 
9
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model, with a rigid randomized arena and purely argumentative dialogic 
sessions. The mini-public of Genoa was set up in the form of a hybrid process, 
with a flexible arena and the discussions alternating between argumentation 
and confrontation.  The design choices in Genoa and Castelfranco contributed 
to generate mechanisms that affected the impact of the processes on the final 
policy decisions. In particular, the hybrid design, although not free from 
problems from a deliberative perspective, proved to be more effective in terms 
of capacity to influence the contents of the final policy decision. Combining a 
flexible arena with a mix of argumentation-based and confrontation-based 
discussions, the Genoa process generated specific mechanisms that helped the 
contents of the process to receive more attention and more careful 
consideration by public institutions. On the contrary, the pure Castelfranco 
model was counterproductive in a two-fold sense, since it did not influence the 
final decision and it raised institutional conflicts. These statements are 
explained in more detail in the following sections. 
 
The Arena 
The Genoa mini-public arena was somewhat flexible: the first meetings were 
open to all the residents, and the participants in the planning workshops were 
recruited through the “outreach” method (Schwarz, 1994). The flexible arena 
was not immune to problems, but it produced three virtuous mechanisms: 1) 
giving space for expression to committees and associations, it favored the 
legitimation of the process by activists usually hostile to the deliberative 
approach (Young, 2000); 2) using the outreach method to include citizens 
during the process, it favored the access of innovative ideas and the emergence 
of useful “bridge-proposals” to redefine the stakes and to stimulate the 
formulation of constructive solutions (Sclavi & Susskind, 2011); 3) making 
the potential for citizen mobilization visible to the institutional authorities, it 
highlighted the costs (in terms of loss of consensus) of the missed 
consideration of the citizens’ recommendations.  
 
The Castelfranco arena was instead rigid: an arena in which 50 randomly 
selected citizens discussed the topic, and experts and stakeholders only 
intervened to present information and express their views. The rigidity of the 
arena proved to be counterproductive for three reasons: 1) the absence of an 
inner expression space for organized groups increased their skepticism toward 
the process and led them to put pressure on jurors outside the mini-public; 2) 
from the first discussion sessions, it became clear that the jurors were 
experiencing a group polarization process (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; 
Myers & Lamm, 1976; Sunstein, 2002), and it was almost impossible for the 
facilitators to weaken this mechanism; 3) the quietness of the pure mini-
public, although surrounded by high media coverage, made the contents of the 
process de facto silent and invisible for the external political and civil society, 
thus weakening the potential for persuasion and the influence of the final 
recommendations.  
 
How the three mechanisms developed in Genoa and Castelfranco is now 
explained in detail. 
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The open meetings in Genoa produced unbalanced discussion arenas, which 
were dominated to a great extent by committees of protesting citizens. 
However, this phase favored a kind of socialization toward the deliberative 
process by some activists, which, in the end, proved to have in part legitimized 
the process. In fact, two episodes of high tension between the Commission and 
the committees did not result in the failure of the process, but only because the 
members of these committees in the end decided to allow the debate to 
continue. As one of the protagonists of the episodes mentioned: “We were 
going to end up in a fight [...] we wondered what to do, whether to go ahead 
with the process or to boycott it. [...] We looked at each other and decided not 
to boycott the debate, because the possible benefits would have outweighed 
the disadvantages (member of Committee X).” 
 
The planning workshops were instead characterized by a greater diversity and 
balance of opinions, and by a higher level of productivity. The outreach 
method essentially consisted in identifying and actively involving reflexive 
citizens (Bobbio, 2010), that is, people who, during the previous meetings or 
through the Notebook of the actors, had stood out as particularly reasonable 
and creative, especially in critical situations. The outreach method could be 
criticized as being overly manipulative, because of the power it gives to 
practitioners. However, thanks to the “outreached” citizens, some innovative 
and challenging ideas positively wrong-footed the HI experts and technicians 
and stimulated their curiosity. The HI technicians did not openly express 
appreciation of these new proposals, and remained officially skeptical, but, as 
noted by one of the participants, “the HI experts then came to the subsequent 
workshops with other technicians, who were more prepared on certain aspects, 
and this made it clear to everyone that they had begun to seriously consider 
some of the proposed ideas.” In the end, these ideas became a core part of the 
new HI project.  
 
Finally, the mobilization of hundreds of citizens during the open meetings (on 
average about 300 people per meeting) had the effect of attracting the attention 
of all the institutional authorities toward the process and to render them well 
aware of the costs (in terms of popular consensus) of ignoring the contents and 
the recommendations coming of the mini-public. The President of the Region, 
although firmly contrary to the new HI project for functional reasons, when 
faced with the mass participation and the public attention that the process had 
created, cautiously evaluated the possibility of disregarding the policy advice 
of the participants and in the end decided not to reject the new HI project. A 
HI technician recalled that “since the early crowded meetings, everybody 
understood that the original project and some of the other options would have 
triggered the opposition of the local community and the Region also 
understood the critical situation perfectly”. At the end of the process, a 
regional public manager confirmed that “the President of the Region, even 
though convinced of the positivity of the original project, chose to stand aside, 
actually leaving the responsibility of the final choice to the Municipality. After 
seeing what happened at the meetings, with hundreds of people and the 
committees shouting, he was worried about causing another commotion”.  
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The citizen committees and local associations in Castelfranco could not 
participate as jurors: they only had access as “witnesses”, who were allowed to 
express their views to the jurors through presentations. They were deprived of 
a space in which to express their activism inside the process. This induced 
them to surreptitiously influence the final recommendations by putting 
pressure on jurors from the outside. As a facilitator explained, “Some of the 
jurors came to some of the sessions with prepared documents containing 
comments and requests formulated outside of the mini-public, and everyone 
knew that the documents came from parallel meetings with the local 
committees.”  
 
The rigidity of the arena, which was composed exclusively of citizens who 
had been recruited before the process, also limited the degree of freedom of 
the facilitators, who had to deal with a group polarization process without any 
chance of intervening through the recruitment of people with other viewpoints 
or opinions during the process. In spite of the random selection, in the end the 
composition of the arena was not balanced, because the members were 
strongly biased against the idea of any waste burning plant in the territory,9 in 
this sense confirming the criticism of Kleinman, et al. (2011) toward random 
selection. From the first sessions, the jurors who were potentially favorable 
toward the idea of a new plant to dispose of the industrial waste of the local 
factories fell into a spiral of silence, that the facilitators were not able to tackle 
simply through dialogic techniques. Over time, the process of group 
polarization developed and all attempts by the facilitators to deal with it failed. 
One of the facilitators recalled the last day of the jury with these words: “in a 
climate of growing tensions, in the end we were forced to do something that a 
facilitator should never do: we started the day with the jurors voting on a 
verdict on the pyro-gasification, which was not exactly the mandate of the 
process, but we had no alternative. The verdict was a unanimous rejection of 
the original project, and we tried to make the jurors at least focus on the 
reasons for their rejection, because no other serious reflection on alternative 
solutions had emerged in the previous discussion sessions. This was a failure 
for us. Deliberative recommendations should be the consequence of the 
arguments, and the arguments should not be built to justify a previous 
decision”.  
 
The jury recommendations did not contain any viable alternative to the 
original project or credible general arguments and suggestions about the 
problem of the industrial waste disposal from the territory. The alternative 
proposal, “a larger cool treatment plant to serve a wider area,” was not 
accompanied by arguments about its feasibility or sustainability, while the 
more general suggestion – “to wait for a Province planning of waste 
management before starting any other waste disposal works” – was actually a 
dilatory argument. The power of the Province was very limited, since the 
management of industrial waste is mainly ruled by national legislation, which 
promotes a free market in the field. Although the Municipality ratified the 
verdict, the recommendations were easily criticized by the company and by 
                                                     
9
 With over 2000 contacts in the municipal area and in the neighborhoods, the research centre 
was able to recruit only 7 participants who had declared to be potentially favorable to the idea 
of a new plant to dispose of industrial waste.  
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the Region, which accused the document of being simply a more sophisticated 
form of a NIMBY refusal. 
 
When a group polarization process takes place, it is difficult to use facilitation 
techniques to combat it. A flexible arena does not guarantee that the mini-
public is immune to such a vicious circle, but it provides facilitators with more 
degrees of freedom, and gives them the opportunity of intervening on the 
balance of the viewpoints and on the characteristics of the participants. In the 
absence of truly constructive solutions from an almost invisible mini-public, 
closed within the rigid boundaries of a group of a few dozen citizens, the 
company felt free to disregard the results of the process, and the President of 
the Region did not hesitate to declare that only a small group of citizens 
refused to accept the project: “If a company has to make a settlement or build 
a plant for waste recovery [...], it cannot be blocked by administrative inertia 
or populism. [...] Some mayors expressed critical statements about the pyro-
gasifier because a small group of citizens opposed it. We cannot lapse into 
populism” (Interview with the President of the Tuscany Region, Il Tirreno, 
November 14, 2011).  
 
The Dialogic Interactions 
Human beings are not used to arguing and exchanging conflicting opinions 
with unknown people, especially in public contexts and when problems 
directly affect personal identity (Johnston Conover, et al. 2002). This is one of 
the main reasons why deliberative mini-publics are designed to reduce the 
spontaneity of common talks and why they are “assisted” by facilitators 
(Moore, 2012). However, when the issues are highly controversial - as in the 
case of land use policies - the pressures of the deliberative setting can collide 
with common cognitive dynamics. When a conflict is developing, the actors 
tend to accentuate the common mechanism of categorization, attributing 
negative prejudices, such as incompetence or opportunism, to the people with 
opposed opinions (Tajfel, 1978, 1981). In purely deliberative processes such 
prejudices tend to be silenced because of the setting: individuals feel forced to 
quietly argue, using universalistic justifications and not partisan interests, and 
to interact respectfully instead of overwhelming the opponents (Duchesne and 
Haegel, 2006). This is what Elster (1994) wisely called the “civilizing force of 
hypocrisy” and Warren (2008) labelled “deliberative diplomacy.” which does 
not exclude the underlying persistence of individualistic orientations, strategic 
behavior or prejudices, but “forces or induces speakers to hide them” (Elster, 
1998, 111). Although this hypocrisy seems to help the recommendation to be 
anchored to public reason, it risks rendering the process too artificial and 
incapable of building really constructive solutions (Adler, 2008; Lenard, 
2008).  
 
In this sense, when deliberation concerns controversial issues, the problem is 
not only to favor the participation of citizens who tend to remain silent, but 
also to favor the construction of creative solutions based on deeper 
consciousness of the adversary viewpoints. The open meetings during the first 
two phases in Genoa were mostly arenas of positional confrontation, although 
structured by rules and conducted by facilitators. In sessions of about three 
hours, the confrontation took place following a speech-demand-answer 
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format: HI technicians and experts presented the project, then citizens put 
written questions in an urn, the President of the Commission drew some 
questions out of the urn and asked the authors to explain them more clearly, 
and then the word passed to the HI technicians and experts who answered the 
questions and provided clarifications. However, the questions that were not 
extracted during the meetings received a response from the technicians in the 
following days, on the process website. In this structured setting, the 
facilitators allowed the participants to vent their accusations, claims and fears, 
and most of them were expressed in a truly non deliberative way, with insults 
and shouting against the experts and the Commission members. More 
deliberative type meetings followed this confrontational phase. This 
combination of confrontational and argumentative sessions had two effects. 
On the one hand, it introduced a distorting element into the overall process, 
since it gave space to a really confrontational mode of interaction (which also 
risked leading the process to failure in two critical moments, as already 
mentioned). On the other hand, it allowed some prejudices to be addressed 
openly and partially deconstructed, thus favoring a better understanding of the 
reciprocal interests and above all of the different viewpoints on the issue. As 
mentioned by the President of the Commission, “latent conflicts were made 
manifest, allowing the lid to be taken off a boiling pot, which sooner or later 
would have exploded. In this case, it exploded inside the process, which was 
probably better than having it explode outside and later on.”  
 
From the analysis of the speech acts, it emerged that, in the first 
confrontational meetings, 36 of 284 contained explicit negative prejudices and 
many other statements alluded to them.10 The main objection of citizens was 
that the original HI project was formulated on mere profit motivations. The HI 
technicians also emerged as being prejudiced about the residents’ motivations. 
In the original project, many of the buildings located under the highway bridge 
would have had to be destroyed. These buildings had a low monetary value 
because of their undesirable location. This is why the HI managers believed 
the residents would have been happy to move to a more attractive 
neighborhood and consequently thought that any opposition would simply 
have been instrumental to obtaining higher monetary compensation. A 
regional civil servant recalled that “the neighborhood was a squalid suburb… 
there were only ugly houses, with railway and the highway bridges above 
them, thus blocking the sky. We all believed that the opposition to the 
expropriations was a strategy to obtain a higher price for the houses.”  
 
Thanks to the clarification of these prejudices, their at least partial 
deconstruction was possible. On the one hand, the HI managers and 
technicians came to understand that, behind the opposition to the building 
abatements, there were also relational motivations, since even a squalid suburb 
had developed social capital over the years. In reaction to this unexpected 
reading of the social impact of the public works, the HI technicians began to 
                                                     
10
 In both cases, the prejudices, here intended as preconceived opinions on the intentions and 
objectives of the adversaries, were identified through a content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002; 
Krippendorf, 2003) of the speech acts. Two human coders then typologized the speech acts 
into two categories: “yes” (the speech act contains a prejudice toward the adversary) and “no” 
(the speech act does not contain any prejudice toward the adversary). 
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think more seriously about alternative projects that could reduce this kind of 
impact. On the other hand, although some organized groups maintained an 
attitude that was clearly oriented toward protest and opposition, some 
members of the citizen committees showed a greater willingness to listen to 
the HI proposals and partially recognized their reasons. As a member of a 
citizen committee recalled: “We shouted and protested, even loudly, but after 
these heated meetings we felt that the approaches were changing, both in the 
HI technicians and in us… we became more aware of what they would have 
been able to redefine and what they could not redefine, while the HI managers 
changed their attitude toward us and proved to have developed a more mature 
understanding of our preoccupations.” An HI technician confirmed this 
reading of the usefulness of the confrontation phase: “In the end, I would say 
that the first meetings, although very hard, were also useful, because they 
allowed us to highlight that the belief of some committees had no foundation 
and, I must admit, that such a project in the city could generate impacts that 
we had not considered in the formulation of the project.”  
 
In Castelfranco, the absence of a confrontational phase between the citizens 
and the Waste Recycling managers prevented the clarification of explicit 
prejudices: only nine of the 306 speech acts contained explicit prejudices 
against the company and no deconstruction mechanism was developed. The 
interviews after the process revealed that the respectful climate of discussion 
was highly unnatural, and that it concealed a reciprocal lack of confidence. 
The experts who expressed positive evaluations on the pyro-gasifier were not 
blamed openly, but subtly put under pressure by the jurors with questions that 
hid hostility and showed a lack of consideration of their arguments. Some 
jurors admitted that “many of us posed questions to the experts in order to 
somehow discredit them and strengthen our position,” because “most of us had 
a preconceived idea, even though we could not state it, that the project only 
existed because of the financial interests of the company.” The prejudice of 
the Waste Recycling managers and technicians about the NIMBY attitude of 
the jurors was not publicly expressed in the quiet jury meetings. At the end of 
the process, the head of Waste Recycling recalled this experience with 
bitterness: “the jurors listened to the experts and analyzed all the documents in 
an atmosphere of respect and calm, but the orientations were already clear, 
although no one revealed them openly, and we did not have the possibility of 
criticizing them. [...] The NIMBY syndrome was too strong. No constructive 
process is possible, where something is burning.” 
 
Overall, it is possible to conclude that a confrontation phase, while weakening 
the integrity of the process in Genoa, allowed the foundations to be laid for a 
more sincere and conscious discussion in the deliberative phase, thus 
increasing the level of confidence and the productivity of the process. This 
finding in some ways empirically justifies the advice of Dryzek (2001) and 
Steiner (2012), that is, to give space to contestation in deliberative processes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present study has analyzed two deliberative mini-publics organized to 
integrate decision-making on highly contentious issues. The aim of the 
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comparative analysis has been to understand why one of the processes had a 
significant effect on policy decisions while the other did not, although both 
were similar in terms of the contextual and institutional aspects identified in 
the literature as important factors of political efficacy of participatory 
practices. Since such kinds of mini-publics do not usually have the formal 
power to make the final decisions of the political authorities binding, 
understanding how they could improve their capacity to influence policy 
decisions becomes a crucial matter.  
 
The empirical studies that have so far addressed this issue have shown that 
some factors are relevant in specific cases of participatory and deliberative 
processes: the existence of an active civil society interested in the topic, a clear 
commitment by the institutional authorities who are responsible for the final 
decisions, and a proper timing of the mini-public, when several options are 
still available in the decisional process. 
 
The present analysis has brought to light how the design of the mini-publics 
can contribute to increasing or weakening their impact on the policy decisions.  
 
The deliberative design of the Genoa mini-public was structured as a hybrid 
path, in which the arena of participants was flexible; a purely deliberative 
phase was mixed with a phase of weakly argued and sometimes even 
disruptive confrontational interactions. This hybridation produced some 
distortions, but it also generated some mechanisms that positively affected the 
influence of the mini-public on policy decisions. First, a confrontation phase 
within the deliberative path favored the legitimation of the process by groups 
who would usually have opposed the deliberative mode of public action 
(Young, 2000). It also allowed the fears and prejudices, which do not usually 
emerge in purely deliberative mini-publics, to be expressed. Their unveiling 
and their at least partial deconstruction favored a better mutual understanding, 
which resulted to be an important precondition for a less artificial climate in 
the subsequent deliberative phase. At the same time, the constant outreaching 
of the facilitators also allowed particularly reflective citizens to be included, 
citizens who were distinguished during the process as being capable of 
challenging the topic by formulating innovative and constructive ideas. All 
this, combined with the public visibility that the confrontational phase gave 
the process, produced an important impact on the institutional authorities, in 
terms of level of attention, and careful consideration of the mini-public 
recommendations.  
 
In the Tuscan case, the process was designed as a pure deliberative mini-
public: a previously randomly selected arena called on to work on the issue 
according to the rules of mutual respect and rational argumentation. Dealing 
with a highly contentious issue, the mini-public immediately collided with the 
real dynamics and the pressures of the context. Despite the use of random 
selection, the research centre that recruited the participants did not manage to 
build a balanced group of citizens, in terms of opinions toward the issue, since 
it concerned a land use policy, which usually raises opposition by local 
populations. At the same time, the one-shot random selection, which excluded 
organized groups from the process, induced these groups to frequently attempt 
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to influence the jurors from the outside. The discussions of the jurors, 
facilitated in a purely deliberative way, were somehow “caged” within rules of 
polite and quiet interaction, focusing on rational arguments and avoiding space 
for confrontation and disrespectful statements. This produced a deliberative 
climate, but also a generalized feeling of hidden mutual distrust. All this 
favored the development of a group polarization process that prevented the 
formulation of constructive recommendations on sustainable solutions, as 
alternatives to the original project. The consequent low credibility of the mini-
public recommendations, together with the low visibility of the deliberative 
process, held exclusively with a small preselected group of citizens working 
behind closed doors, made it easier for the Region to disregard the contents of 
the deliberative process. 
 
From these findings, it can be suggested that, on highly controversial issues 
(or at least on LULU matters), a pure deliberative format can induce 
mechanisms that significantly undermine the deliberativeness of the 
minipublic and weaken its influence on policy decisions. Our conclusions are 
partially consistent with those of Karpowitz and Mansbridge (2005). On the 
basis of an analysis of a deliberative process in Princeton, they argued that a 
purely deliberative process failed to discover the underlying conflicts and thus 
“seemed to have produced not consensus but a backlash of anger and 
frustration” (p. 353). If “the larger question is the degree to which deeply 
opposed conflicts in interest, when discovered, can be handled within the 
deliberative process itself,” (p. 349) without promoting or rejecting a 
particular type of instrument or technique (public debate vs. citizen jury), our 
conclusions suggest the hypothesis that the use of hybrid paths could be more 
effective in countering the distortions that necessarily emerge in real contexts, 
and in enhancing the political efficacy of deliberative mini-publics.  
 
The kind of hybridization identified in this article is not the only possible one, 
nor necessarily the best. Other design aspects, such as the forms of interaction 
between experts and participants or the timing of the different phases, could 
also be important. This is why an interesting line of research could be to test 
this hypothesis through other case studies and through specific experiments, 
aimed at comparing different forms of hybridization, in order to identify their 
specific effects. 
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